Trotskiy, whose train had been based at Voronezh since early November, expedited a regroupment that raised Eighth Army’s strength to 26,000 men, and on the army’s right he stationed 20,000 partisans designated as the Kozhevnikov Group (after their commander I. S. Kozhevnikov, one of Antonov-Ovseenko’s deputies) inside the Ukrainian border. On 1 January, two days after Slaven had issued an operations order projecting a starting date between 7 and 10 January for the South Front offensive, Mamantov’s Cossacks began a third attack on Tsaritsyn; and Yegorov, who had taken over Tenth Army, reported that he had found less than half of the troops sufficiently trained and organized to be considered combat-worthy. The Cossacks reached the Volga north of Tsaritsyn on the 12th and four days later were on the river at Sarepta south of the city. Eighth Army, which had opened its offensive on the 4th, was stalled by counterattacks. Slaven threatened to bring the army commander, V. M. Gittis, before a revolutionary tribunal if he did not get moving and reported to Vatsetis that South Front had the enemy surrounded on three sides and was ‘endeavoring’ to attack from all of them but ‘for the present moment’ the situation at Tsaritsyn was ‘extremely serious’.32 Complications had also arisen with regard to the second stage, the occupation of the Ukraine. On 2 January, with Trotskiy’s encouragement (given when the outlook for the South Front had appeared brighter) the 2nd Ukrainian Partisan Division, one of four in the Kozhevnikov Group, had seized Kharkov. The Bolshevik provisional Ukrainian government, which until then had been confined to issuing proclamations in absentia from Kursk while the Directory was ensconced in Kiev, had established itself in Kharkov on the 3rd. Trotskiy then argued that unless the Soviet Government was willing to disavow its people in the Ukraine and see the Allies, who he claimed were ready to land 100,000–150,000 troops, take Kiev, Kursk, and possibly Moscow, a Ukrainian 78 an armed camp Front would have to be activated and begin an offensive in the Ukraine at once.33 Events in the Ukraine – and in Siberia – had also brought Stalin back into military affairs. At East Front late in November, Mikhail Lashevich, a very senior Bolshevik and member of the semiautonomous Petrograd bureau of the Central Committee, had taken over Third Army proposing to lead it on an advance to Ekatrinburg. Third Army, with 35,000 troops the largest in East Front by far, was loosely organized into three divisions spread over a 240-mile front. Concurrently looking for a success to mark his assumption of supreme command, Admiral Kolchak had ordered the Czech general, Rudolf Gajda, who was coming on the Ekatrinburg front to attack toward Perm. Gajda’s offensive had pre-empted Lashevich’s by one day and had reached Perm and the line of the Kama River on 25 December. In the final ten days or so, Third Army had disintegrated, the retreat had become a rout, and more than half of the troops had disappeared. Lashevich had completely lost control and taken to drink. Trotskiy had talked about replacing him, but, as the Tsaritsyn experience had shown, disciplining a well-connected party member was no simple matter. On 31 December, Lenin had asked Trotskiy to go to Third Army and added that he had also thought of sending Stalin. Trotskiy, who was engaged with more immediately crucial problems at South Front, had responded with a, nevertheless, surprisingly enthusiastic endorsement for Stalin, who, he said, should be sent with ‘full authority’ from the party and the RMCR to restore order and severely punish offenders. Stalin and the chief of the Cheka, Dzerzhinskiy, had arrived at Third Army headquarters 120 miles west of Perm on 7 January with a mandate ‘to investigate the causes of the city’s surrender’ as well as to restore the situation at the front.34 From a thousand miles away in Siberia, Stalin’s influence had again reached into the south where he could claim a voice in Ukrainian affairs as People’s Commissar for Nationalities and (since October 1918) a member of the Ukrainian Central Committee. Voroshilov and his associates in the Tsaritsyn group had gone to Kharkov, and Lenin and Sverdlov had suggested as a ‘compromise’ with Stalin appointing Rukhimovich, who had been the commissar for military affairs in the short-lived Ukrainian Soviet government of early 1918, either to that post again or making him the Ukrainian Front commander. Trotskiy had protested that the appointment would be ‘a rotten compromise’ because Rukhimovich was ‘a pseudonym for Voroshilov’, and recommended that they read Ikulov’s report on Tenth Army which showed ‘how Voroshilov demoralized it with Stalin’s assistance’.35 Trotskiy had managed to secure Antonov-Ovseenko’s appointment as Ukrainian Front commander and Podvoyskiy’s as Ukrainian military affairs commissar; but Voroshilov had become the Ukrainian internal affairs commissar; Shchadenko had gone into the Ukrainian Front RMC; Mezhlauk had become one of Podvoyskiy’s deputies; Rukhimovich had taken over Ukrainian army organization; and Parkhomenko had found a place as Kharkov regional military affairs commissar.
Trotskiy, whose train had been based at Voronezh since early November, expedited a regroupment that raised Eighth Army’s strength to 26,000 men, and on the army’s right he stationed 20,000 partisans designated as the Kozhevnikov Group (after their commander I. S. Kozhevnikov, one of Antonov-Ovseenko’s deputies) inside the Ukrainian border. On 1 January, two days after Slaven had issued an operations order projecting a starting date between 7 and 10 January for the South Front offensive, Mamantov’s Cossacks began a third attack on Tsaritsyn; and Yegorov, who had taken over Tenth Army, reported that he had found less than half of the troops sufficiently trained and organized to be considered combat-worthy. The Cossacks reached the Volga north of Tsaritsyn on the 12th and four days later were on the river at Sarepta south of the city. Eighth Army, which had opened its offensive on the 4th, was stalled by counterattacks. Slaven threatened to bring the army commander, V. M. Gittis, before a revolutionary tribunal if he did not get moving and reported to Vatsetis that South Front had the enemy surrounded on three sides and was ‘endeavoring’ to attack from all of them but ‘for the present moment’ the situation at Tsaritsyn was ‘extremely serious’.32 Complications had also arisen with regard to the second stage, the occupation of the Ukraine. On 2 January, with Trotskiy’s encouragement (given when the outlook for the South Front had appeared brighter) the 2nd Ukrainian Partisan Division, one of four in the Kozhevnikov Group, had seized Kharkov. The Bolshevik provisional Ukrainian government, which until then had been confined to issuing proclamations in absentia from Kursk while the Directory was ensconced in Kiev, had established itself in Kharkov on the 3rd. Trotskiy then argued that unless the Soviet Government was willing to disavow its people in the Ukraine and see the Allies, who he claimed were ready to land 100,000–150,000 troops, take Kiev, Kursk, and possibly Moscow, a Ukrainian 78 an armed camp Front would have to be activated and begin an offensive in the Ukraine at once.33 Events in the Ukraine – and in Siberia – had also brought Stalin back into military affairs. At East Front late in November, Mikhail Lashevich, a very senior Bolshevik and member of the semiautonomous Petrograd bureau of the Central Committee, had taken over Third Army proposing to lead it on an advance to Ekatrinburg. Third Army, with 35,000 troops the largest in East Front by far, was loosely organized into three divisions spread over a 240-mile front. Concurrently looking for a success to mark his assumption of supreme command, Admiral Kolchak had ordered the Czech general, Rudolf Gajda, who was coming on the Ekatrinburg front to attack toward Perm. Gajda’s offensive had pre-empted Lashevich’s by one day and had reached Perm and the line of the Kama River on 25 December. In the final ten days or so, Third Army had disintegrated, the retreat had become a rout, and more than half of the troops had disappeared. Lashevich had completely lost control and taken to drink. Trotskiy had talked about replacing him, but, as the Tsaritsyn experience had shown, disciplining a well-connected party member was no simple matter. On 31 December, Lenin had asked Trotskiy to go to Third Army and added that he had also thought of sending Stalin. Trotskiy, who was engaged with more immediately crucial problems at South Front, had responded with a, nevertheless, surprisingly enthusiastic endorsement for Stalin, who, he said, should be sent with ‘full authority’ from the party and the RMCR to restore order and severely punish offenders. Stalin and the chief of the Cheka, Dzerzhinskiy, had arrived at Third Army headquarters 120 miles west of Perm on 7 January with a mandate ‘to investigate the causes of the city’s surrender’ as well as to restore the situation at the front.34 From a thousand miles away in Siberia, Stalin’s influence had again reached into the south where he could claim a voice in Ukrainian affairs as People’s Commissar for Nationalities and (since October 1918) a member of the Ukrainian Central Committee. Voroshilov and his associates in the Tsaritsyn group had gone to Kharkov, and Lenin and Sverdlov had suggested as a ‘compromise’ with Stalin appointing Rukhimovich, who had been the commissar for military affairs in the short-lived Ukrainian Soviet government of early 1918, either to that post again or making him the Ukrainian Front commander. Trotskiy had protested that the appointment would be ‘a rotten compromise’ because Rukhimovich was ‘a pseudonym for Voroshilov’, and recommended that they read Ikulov’s report on Tenth Army which showed ‘how Voroshilov demoralized it with Stalin’s assistance’.35 Trotskiy had managed to secure Antonov-Ovseenko’s appointment as Ukrainian Front commander and Podvoyskiy’s as Ukrainian military affairs commissar; but Voroshilov had become the Ukrainian internal affairs commissar; Shchadenko had gone into the Ukrainian Front RMC; Mezhlauk had become one of Podvoyskiy’s deputies; Rukhimovich had taken over Ukrainian army organization; and Parkhomenko had found a place as Kharkov regional military affairs commissar.