In another day, the Cossack offensive subsided, and on the 18th, Stalin told Lenin and Sverdlov that the front was firm, Tenth Army’s troops were attacking, and if the situation did not worsen in the meantime, he would leave for Moscow ‘tomorrow’. The Steel Division’s arrival after a 16-day march marked the turning point in the second encirclement and came later to be regarded as the outstanding early manifestation of Stalin’s prescience in military affairs, he having had the foresight to defy Trotskiy and call in the division. Order No. 118, which Trotskiy had countermanded on 5 October, does appear in that respect either to have been a stroke of genius or of great good luck. But by the 5th, the Steel Division had been on its way toward Tsaritsyn and Trotskiy’s greater concern was Stalin’s attempt to capture control of the North Caucasus forces for the Tsaritsyn faction in the South Front RMC.16 The Steel Division was a reliably effective unit, hence a very significant addition to Tenth Army, but it did not reverse the course of the battle by itself. Sytin provided the 2nd Moscow and 38th Rogozhsko–Simonovskiy Regiments, both composed of Moscow workers, and they also stiffened the drive to push the Cossacks back to the Don River that continued until 25 October. The Cossacks’ most discouraging single experience may well have been their encounter with 13 armored trains that came into play on the 15th and 16th when they approached Tsaritsyn. From Moscow, Stalin dispatched a telegram to ‘Commander, Tsaritsyn Front, Voroshilov’ on 22 October. It read: Give the Morozovsk, Tikhoretsk, 3rd Revolutionary and other regiments that have encircled the enemy and beaten him over the head my fervent communist greetings. Tell them that Soviet Russia will never forget their heroic deeds and will give them their due reward. Long live the gallant troops of Tsaritsyn Front!17 Soviet Russia would indeed not forget while Stalin lived or after. The reward for most of those who had been there would be small; for some, for Voroshilov, 71 the red army 1918–1941 Budennyy, Semen Timoshenko (who commanded the Crimean Regiment, a converted partisan detachment), and G. I. Kulik (Voroshilov’s chief of artillery), it would be enormous. stalin, trotskiy and the ‘military question’ To Lenin, and through him to Trotskiy, Stalin presented himself as an essential intermediary between the center and the forces in the south whose first concern all along had been to avert the errors the others less knowledgeable than he would have made. Subtly distancing himself from them, he characterized Voroshilov and Minin as valuable workers whom he had persuaded to comply fully with orders from the center. The ammunition shortage, he said, was the whole cause of their dissatisfaction. For himself he expressed a desire to return to the south and work with Sytin and Mekhonoshin in the South Front RMC and to become a member of the RMCR. He was also willing, he said, to meet with Trotskiy to compose their past differences, which Lenin indicated he would be very pleased to see happen. Trotskiy was in Tsaritsyn during the last week of October and stayed into early November awaiting word from Lenin as to whether he would be needed in Moscow at a special All-Russia Congress of Soviets that was being called to commemorate the October Revolution. The Tsaritsyn delegation was rumored to be primed to raise the ‘military question’ at the congress. After Lenin told him on the 3rd that the question was not on the agenda and would not be put on it, he left the next day for Astrakhan. In the meantime, he had decided to keep Voroshilov on at Tenth Army after giving him a military specialist chief of staff and a new RMC member, A. I. Okulor, to replace Minin, whom he dismissed as an incorrigible troublemaker. To a request from Lenin and Sverdlov that he act to satisfy Voroshilov’s ‘frantic’ demands for more ammunition he replied that shortages existed everywhere and the trouble at Tsaritsyn was an ‘incredible, completely rabid expenditure of ammunition’ at a time when economy ought to be practiced.18 Although Lenin apparently wanted to accommodate Stalin’s expressed desire for a prominent place in the military work and Trotskiy was not disposed to take issue with Lenin, Stalin did not return to the south or enter the RMCR.19 As Lenin had promised, the Congress of Soviets also did not take up the ‘military question’; nevertheless, it did become the setting in which Stalin and Trotskiy established the positions from which they would henceforth contend with each other.
In another day, the Cossack offensive subsided, and on the 18th, Stalin told Lenin and Sverdlov that the front was firm, Tenth Army’s troops were attacking, and if the situation did not worsen in the meantime, he would leave for Moscow ‘tomorrow’. The Steel Division’s arrival after a 16-day march marked the turning point in the second encirclement and came later to be regarded as the outstanding early manifestation of Stalin’s prescience in military affairs, he having had the foresight to defy Trotskiy and call in the division. Order No. 118, which Trotskiy had countermanded on 5 October, does appear in that respect either to have been a stroke of genius or of great good luck. But by the 5th, the Steel Division had been on its way toward Tsaritsyn and Trotskiy’s greater concern was Stalin’s attempt to capture control of the North Caucasus forces for the Tsaritsyn faction in the South Front RMC.16 The Steel Division was a reliably effective unit, hence a very significant addition to Tenth Army, but it did not reverse the course of the battle by itself. Sytin provided the 2nd Moscow and 38th Rogozhsko–Simonovskiy Regiments, both composed of Moscow workers, and they also stiffened the drive to push the Cossacks back to the Don River that continued until 25 October. The Cossacks’ most discouraging single experience may well have been their encounter with 13 armored trains that came into play on the 15th and 16th when they approached Tsaritsyn. From Moscow, Stalin dispatched a telegram to ‘Commander, Tsaritsyn Front, Voroshilov’ on 22 October. It read: Give the Morozovsk, Tikhoretsk, 3rd Revolutionary and other regiments that have encircled the enemy and beaten him over the head my fervent communist greetings. Tell them that Soviet Russia will never forget their heroic deeds and will give them their due reward. Long live the gallant troops of Tsaritsyn Front!17 Soviet Russia would indeed not forget while Stalin lived or after. The reward for most of those who had been there would be small; for some, for Voroshilov, 71 the red army 1918–1941 Budennyy, Semen Timoshenko (who commanded the Crimean Regiment, a converted partisan detachment), and G. I. Kulik (Voroshilov’s chief of artillery), it would be enormous. stalin, trotskiy and the ‘military question’ To Lenin, and through him to Trotskiy, Stalin presented himself as an essential intermediary between the center and the forces in the south whose first concern all along had been to avert the errors the others less knowledgeable than he would have made. Subtly distancing himself from them, he characterized Voroshilov and Minin as valuable workers whom he had persuaded to comply fully with orders from the center. The ammunition shortage, he said, was the whole cause of their dissatisfaction. For himself he expressed a desire to return to the south and work with Sytin and Mekhonoshin in the South Front RMC and to become a member of the RMCR. He was also willing, he said, to meet with Trotskiy to compose their past differences, which Lenin indicated he would be very pleased to see happen. Trotskiy was in Tsaritsyn during the last week of October and stayed into early November awaiting word from Lenin as to whether he would be needed in Moscow at a special All-Russia Congress of Soviets that was being called to commemorate the October Revolution. The Tsaritsyn delegation was rumored to be primed to raise the ‘military question’ at the congress. After Lenin told him on the 3rd that the question was not on the agenda and would not be put on it, he left the next day for Astrakhan. In the meantime, he had decided to keep Voroshilov on at Tenth Army after giving him a military specialist chief of staff and a new RMC member, A. I. Okulor, to replace Minin, whom he dismissed as an incorrigible troublemaker. To a request from Lenin and Sverdlov that he act to satisfy Voroshilov’s ‘frantic’ demands for more ammunition he replied that shortages existed everywhere and the trouble at Tsaritsyn was an ‘incredible, completely rabid expenditure of ammunition’ at a time when economy ought to be practiced.18 Although Lenin apparently wanted to accommodate Stalin’s expressed desire for a prominent place in the military work and Trotskiy was not disposed to take issue with Lenin, Stalin did not return to the south or enter the RMCR.19 As Lenin had promised, the Congress of Soviets also did not take up the ‘military question’; nevertheless, it did become the setting in which Stalin and Trotskiy established the positions from which they would henceforth contend with each other.