Within the day, Stalin and Voroshilov, as ‘party members’, fired off a telegram to Lenin ‘protesting categorically’ that to carry out Trotskiy’s order would be 69 the red army 1918–1941 ‘criminal’ because Trotskiy did not have ‘the slightest idea’ of what the situation on the southern front was like and had put the entire control of the front ‘in the hands of General Sytin, a man who is not only useless but untrustworthy and therefore dangerous’. It was necessary, they insisted, that the Central Committee investigate Trotskiy’s ‘demeaning of respected party members to please traitorous military specialists’ and his ‘inadmissible’ issuing of personal orders, examining as well ‘the question of military specialists from the non-party counterrevolutionary camp’. Trotskiy countered with a ‘categorical’ demand for Stalin’s recall. In a note written on the 5th, Sverdlov told Lenin that he had talked with ‘those in Tsaritsyn and found the situation to be more complicated than it had appeared’; therefore, Stalin’s coming to Moscow would be ‘useful’. Stalin left Tsaritsyn on the 6th, returned on the 11th, and passed through Kozlov, where Trotskiy had arrived on the 5th, twice without stopping. In the accounts published during his lifetime, Stalin is portrayed as having made the trip to frustrate Trotskiy’s ill-advised, if not nefarious, effort to remove him and Voroshilov from Tsaritsyn at the height of the battle. Lenin, who most likely took into account, as Trotskiy had not, the political and psychological effects of disciplining two prominent and obstreperous Bolsheviks at that time, allowed Stalin to return – but apparently with an understanding that he would arrange his own early removal from Tsaritsyn. Stalin made the decision easier by diverting his attack from Trotskiy to Sytin and his alleged ‘henchmen’ among the military specialists, who he accused of denying weapons and ammunition to the Tsaritsyn front; and he departed from Moscow on the 9th with a warrant from Sverdlov authorizing him to requisition a special train to hasten the trip back. On his return, he told Sverdlov by telegraph that because ‘not a single shell or a single bullet’ had reached Tsaritsyn during his absence, he was going to impound the records and come to Moscow shortly to lay the ‘whole horrible situation’ before the Central Committee. Lenin had manifestly not given Stalin what he, Voroshilov, and their associates at Tsaritsyn wanted most, namely, an exemption from the RMCR regulations. While Stalin was gone, Trotskiy had set about reorganizing South Front. His presence and three new members in the front RMC enabled Sytin to activate the armies, Eighth and Ninth Armies on the line west of Kamyshin, Tenth Army in the Kamyshin–Tsaritsyn sector, Eleventh Army in the western North Caucasus, and Twelfth Army in the eastern North Caucasus. Military specialists V. V. Chernavin and A. I. Yegorov commanded Eighth and Ninth Armies. Voroshilov had been named acting commander of Tenth Army, Sorokin of Eleventh Army, and a commander for Twelfth Army had still to be found. Trotskiy, who knew how military specialists had been handled at Tsaritsyn, had said that even though Voroshilov was totally unqualified to manage a 50,000-man army, he could have the Tenth Army command provided he took orders from and reported regularly to Sytin. Stalin and Minin had not been formally excluded from the South Front RMC, but under the RMCR regulations, as long as they stayed with Tenth Army they only possessed the authority of army RMC members. 70 an armed camp The second encirclement of Tsaritsyn was in the making on the day Stalin returned. He told Sverdlov that the Cossacks were five versts (about four miles) from the Volga south of the city. According to later Soviet accounts, the Cossacks had 45,000 men to Tenth Army’s 40,000, but Trotskiy used the number 50,000, and the actual Tenth Army strength at mid-month appears to have been nearer 60,000.15 The Cossacks’ main thrust had been in the south. On the 12th, they stepped up the attacks in the center and in the north; and in another two days, they were threatening the outlying settlements, Sarepta, Beketovka, and Voroponovo, after having reached the Volga north of the city and crossed it on the south. Voroshilov was sufficiently desperate by the 15th to establish contact with Sytin via the telegraph, and when Sytin asked for a situation report, Minin told him it was ‘tragic’ and the evacuation of Tsaritsyn was beginning. Late in the day on the 16th, Minin told Sytin that Voroponovo, the settlement closest to Tsaritsyn, had been lost,the situation was ‘most serious’ and would have been worse had Zholba’s Steel Division not arrived at Sarepta during the previous night and encircled some 1,500 White Guards there.
Within the day, Stalin and Voroshilov, as ‘party members’, fired off a telegram to Lenin ‘protesting categorically’ that to carry out Trotskiy’s order would be 69 the red army 1918–1941 ‘criminal’ because Trotskiy did not have ‘the slightest idea’ of what the situation on the southern front was like and had put the entire control of the front ‘in the hands of General Sytin, a man who is not only useless but untrustworthy and therefore dangerous’. It was necessary, they insisted, that the Central Committee investigate Trotskiy’s ‘demeaning of respected party members to please traitorous military specialists’ and his ‘inadmissible’ issuing of personal orders, examining as well ‘the question of military specialists from the non-party counterrevolutionary camp’. Trotskiy countered with a ‘categorical’ demand for Stalin’s recall. In a note written on the 5th, Sverdlov told Lenin that he had talked with ‘those in Tsaritsyn and found the situation to be more complicated than it had appeared’; therefore, Stalin’s coming to Moscow would be ‘useful’. Stalin left Tsaritsyn on the 6th, returned on the 11th, and passed through Kozlov, where Trotskiy had arrived on the 5th, twice without stopping. In the accounts published during his lifetime, Stalin is portrayed as having made the trip to frustrate Trotskiy’s ill-advised, if not nefarious, effort to remove him and Voroshilov from Tsaritsyn at the height of the battle. Lenin, who most likely took into account, as Trotskiy had not, the political and psychological effects of disciplining two prominent and obstreperous Bolsheviks at that time, allowed Stalin to return – but apparently with an understanding that he would arrange his own early removal from Tsaritsyn. Stalin made the decision easier by diverting his attack from Trotskiy to Sytin and his alleged ‘henchmen’ among the military specialists, who he accused of denying weapons and ammunition to the Tsaritsyn front; and he departed from Moscow on the 9th with a warrant from Sverdlov authorizing him to requisition a special train to hasten the trip back. On his return, he told Sverdlov by telegraph that because ‘not a single shell or a single bullet’ had reached Tsaritsyn during his absence, he was going to impound the records and come to Moscow shortly to lay the ‘whole horrible situation’ before the Central Committee. Lenin had manifestly not given Stalin what he, Voroshilov, and their associates at Tsaritsyn wanted most, namely, an exemption from the RMCR regulations. While Stalin was gone, Trotskiy had set about reorganizing South Front. His presence and three new members in the front RMC enabled Sytin to activate the armies, Eighth and Ninth Armies on the line west of Kamyshin, Tenth Army in the Kamyshin–Tsaritsyn sector, Eleventh Army in the western North Caucasus, and Twelfth Army in the eastern North Caucasus. Military specialists V. V. Chernavin and A. I. Yegorov commanded Eighth and Ninth Armies. Voroshilov had been named acting commander of Tenth Army, Sorokin of Eleventh Army, and a commander for Twelfth Army had still to be found. Trotskiy, who knew how military specialists had been handled at Tsaritsyn, had said that even though Voroshilov was totally unqualified to manage a 50,000-man army, he could have the Tenth Army command provided he took orders from and reported regularly to Sytin. Stalin and Minin had not been formally excluded from the South Front RMC, but under the RMCR regulations, as long as they stayed with Tenth Army they only possessed the authority of army RMC members. 70 an armed camp The second encirclement of Tsaritsyn was in the making on the day Stalin returned. He told Sverdlov that the Cossacks were five versts (about four miles) from the Volga south of the city. According to later Soviet accounts, the Cossacks had 45,000 men to Tenth Army’s 40,000, but Trotskiy used the number 50,000, and the actual Tenth Army strength at mid-month appears to have been nearer 60,000.15 The Cossacks’ main thrust had been in the south. On the 12th, they stepped up the attacks in the center and in the north; and in another two days, they were threatening the outlying settlements, Sarepta, Beketovka, and Voroponovo, after having reached the Volga north of the city and crossed it on the south. Voroshilov was sufficiently desperate by the 15th to establish contact with Sytin via the telegraph, and when Sytin asked for a situation report, Minin told him it was ‘tragic’ and the evacuation of Tsaritsyn was beginning. Late in the day on the 16th, Minin told Sytin that Voroponovo, the settlement closest to Tsaritsyn, had been lost,the situation was ‘most serious’ and would have been worse had Zholba’s Steel Division not arrived at Sarepta during the previous night and encircled some 1,500 White Guards there.